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ith the United States gradually pulling 
out its troops from Afghanistan and the 
Karzai government working hard W
towards reconciliation with the Taliban, the role of  
regional players in the future of  the region has 
assumed greater significance. The role of  immediate 
neighbours like Iran, Pakistan and India may be 
ascertained with some degree of  certainty. Other 
stakeholders in the region's future—Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia and Central Asian Republics—too 
could be identified without much difficulty. But it is 
the “elephant in the room”, China, whose role in 
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Abstract
China's engagement with Afghanistan has become very crucial as the US gradually pulls out its troops from the 
country. China has increased its investment in infrastructure projects in Afghanistan to US$1 billion from 
negligible amounts within a period of  one year. In a departure from its economic policies with other countries, it 
has agreed to allow Afghan locals to work on its projects instead of  sending Chinese nationals. Despite its 
growing economic presence, China has maintained a low profile politically but is engaging with Afghanistan at a 
bilateral level. It is also using multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to address 
issues like terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering that emerge from Afghanistan. Though it is still to be 
seen whether China would assert itself  after the withdrawal of  coalition forces, one thing is certain:  China is very 
well poised in the Afghan endgame.
Keywords : Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, US, Terrorism, Radicalization, Tradea and Economy, Good-
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                      Deng Xiaoping
(on China's approach to international affairs) 
“Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a 
low profile, and never claim leadership.” 
Afghanistan remains opaque. Will China assert itself  
after the US drawdown or will it remain content with 
a peripheral role? Like the US, China's actions in 
Afghanistan in the next three years will be a litmus 
test, and an indicator, of  its growing power and 
ambition. 
Road to Kabul
China's relations with Afghanistan in the past ten 
years have largely been cordial and highly functional, 
particularly in the economic domain. The two 
countries share a small 200 km border called the 
Wakhan Corridor. Having established diplomatic ties 
in 1955 during the premiership of  Zhou Enlai of  
China and rule of  Mohammad Zahir Shah of  
Afghanistan, these two neighbours witnessed a 
diplomatic low between 1978-2002. This was 
primarily because Afghanistan had a Communist 
regime between 1978-1992 that was under the 
tutelage of  the Soviet Union until its collapse. 
China strongly condemned the Soviet invasion of  
Afghanistan in 1979 and went ahead with providing 
“moral and military assistance to the Afghan 
mujahideen and Pakistan to counter the Soviet 
1encirclement” . Post 1992, though China did not 
recongnise the Taliban government in Afghanistan, 
relations between the countries normalised for a 
while. However, the ongoing civil war coupled with 
strong support by the Taliban to Uighur rebels in 
Xinjiang province of  China and the East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM), angered China and 
forced it to freeze diplomatic relations with 
Afghanistan. In fact, it went ahead and supported the 
Northern Alliance that played a crucial role in the 
overthrow of  the Taliban. However, with the US-led 
Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
invasion of  Afghanistan and the institution of  a new 
government under President Hamid Karzai relations 
between the two countries have improved 
tremendously.
A critical appraisal of  China's engagement with 
Afghanistan, however, is difficult due to high degree 
of  information asymmetry and because most 
primary sources of  information stem from state-
based news agencies. Also, there is little information 
available in the public domain on China's role on the 
ground. Thus, based on accessible details, the first 
section of  this paper will elucidate China's 
engagement with Afghanistan economically. This 
section will help in clarifying the first point of  the 
argument that China is looking at long-term 
investments in the country and tapping important 
natural resources such as copper and iron-ore that 
are highly crucial for the development of  any 
country. 
Interestingly, unlike in Africa, China will not be 
sending its own labour force to Afghanistan—this 
might be due to security concerns, but the policy will 
have positive social fallout for China in terms of  
creating goodwill among Afghan people. This 
section will be followed by an analysis of  China's 
engagement with Afghanistan in the political sphere 
and the geostrategic conditions that steer and shape 
China's current involvement with the war-ravaged 
country. Explicating regional and global power 
equations and aspirations of  various countries in and 
around South Asia, this section will help in proving 
the second point—China will have more economic 
and political leeway in Afghanistan in the years to 
come, in comparison to the US. It will show that 
China's Afghan policy is not simply driven by its 
economic interests such as transit routes and energy 
security, but also by its strategic goals as an emerging 
power.   
I. Economic Engagement 
Afghanistan is one of  the most under developed 
countries in the world with acute poverty, very high 
levels of  unemployment, and poor infrastructure. It 
ranks 127, the lowest, in the United Nations 
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Development Index in terms of  Human 
2Development Index (HDI)  while more than 90 per 
3cent of  its budget is constituted of  foreign aid . 
Given this scenario, China has come up as an 
important economic player in Afghanistan over the 
last ten years. It provided US$75 million as economic 
aid to Afghanistan in late 2009, increasing the figure 
4to a total of  US$1 billion since 2008 . Moreover, its 
bilateral trade increased from a total of  US$19.58 
5million in 1999 to US$155 million in 2008 . To boost 
bilateral trade, the two countries had established the 
Sino-Afghan economic committee in 2006 that lifted 
custom duties on 278 commodities. Interestingly, 
although China's exports to Afghanistan have more 
than tripled from US$51.21 million in 2005 to 
US$152 million in 2008, its imports from 
Afghanistan increased from a meagre value of  
US$1.56 million in 2005 to US$3 million (See Figure 
1). 
These statistics are further set to increase with the 
establ ishment of  the China-Afghanistan 
Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership that 
included signing of  three agreements between the 
two countries during Hamid Karzai's visit to China in 
March 2010. The three agreements span extensive 
economic and technological cooperation that will 
provide favourable tariffs for certain export 
commodities of  Afghanistan and technical 
programmes. Chinese President Hu Jintao, during 
Karzai's visit, also called for greater cooperation in 
mining, hydroelectric, agriculture, infrastructure and 
irrigation projects. 
In addition to economic aid and bilateral trade, the 
Sino-Afghan economic committee identified sectors 
such as natural resources, road construction, 
electricity, and agriculture as holding good prospects 
7of  cooperation . Afghanistan is a highly mineral rich 
country with vast reserves of  iron ore, copper, coal, 
gas, cobalt, gold, mercury, l ithium, and 
thorium–most of  which are untapped and are 
8estimated to be worth US$1 trillion . For instance, 
the Haji Gak mine, one of  Afghanistan's largest iron 
oxide deposits has recently been opened to global 
investors. 
This mine is estimated to have two billion tonnes of  
iron with the percentage of  iron content in these 
reserves estimated between 63 to 65 per cent, which 
is highest in the world. Though the bidding process 
for Haji Gak is still on, the tender for the only big 
mining project worth US$88 billion in a village called 
Mes Aynak in the volatile Logar province has already 
been won by the China Metallurgical Corporation 
(MCC). Having launched an US$3.5 billion bid in 
2007, the MCC outbid its western rivals such as 
Russia's Basic Element Group, London-based 
Kazakhmys Consortium, Canada's Hunter 
Dickinson, and US copper mining firm Phelps 
Dodge, by a huge margin.
The Aynak copper field is the largest undeveloped 
field in the world that remains untouched since the 
Soviet invasion in 1979. MCC's investment is the 
biggest foreign investment in the history of  
Afghanistan and not only involves mining, but also 
the construction of  a US$500 million electrical plant 
and railway from Tajikistan to Pakistan in order to 
support exploration. The Aynak copper mine is 
expected to generate about 1,80,000 tonnes of  
copper initially, which is estimated to grow up to 
3,20,000 tonnes. While China will be entitled to half  
of  the output, Afghanistan will have the rest. Apart 
from investing in the Aynak copper mine, China's 
biggest telecom equipment manufacturers, Huawei 
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Year Total Chinese Exports Chinese Imports
1999 19.58 16.68 2.90
2000 25.29 19.89 5.40
2002 19.99 19.92 0.08
2003 27.06 26.45 0.61
2004 57.92 56.97 0.95
2005 52.77 51.21 1.56
2006 100.66 100.47 0.19
2007 171 169 2
2008 154 152 3
6Figure 1: China-Afghanistan Bilateral Trade (In million US$)
and ZTC, have built Internet expansion equipment 
and cell phone technoogies all across Afghanistan. 
China has also been involved in the Parwan irrigation 
project as well as rebuilding hospitals in Kandahar 
and Kabul (Kabul Republic Hospital). Moreover, 
talks are underway for Chinese investment in 11 
natural gas sites in northwest Afghanistan and in the 
development of  the Haji Gak iron ore deposits 
mentioned before. 
Though the above statistics show that China is 
getting substantially involved in Afghanistan, they 
might not reflect its strategic calculations in the 
country. In fact, when compared with economic 
commitments of  the US and India in Afghanistan, 
Chinese investments look very miniscule. Apart from 
its bilateral trade, India has already invested close to 
US$2 billion in Afghanistan, while US investment is 
9as high as US$56 billion because of  the ongoing war . 
A comparative analysis of  Chinese investments in 
other South Asian and Central Asian republics vis-à-
vis Afghanistan, however, reflects that regardless of  
its relatively small economic presence in the country 
(in comparison to the US and India), China is 
seriously consolidating its economic base in 
Afghanistan for a long-term presence. Figure 2 will 
illustrate this point. 
China's investments in Afghanistan have witnessed 
the largest hike compared to any other Central Asian 
or South Asian country, except Pakistan. It rose from 
US$0.10 million in 2007 to US$113.91 million in 
2008, making it more than the Chinese investment in 
India as well, which stand at US$101.88 million. This 
spectacular rate of  investment in Afghanistan 
coupled with the fact that it will not be sending many 
of  its citizens–who might constitute a maximum of  
15 per cent of  the total labour force employed on 
Chinese projects in Afghanistan– proves the first 
point of  this paper's argument that China is there to 
stay in Afghanistan for the long term. 
Having established China's economic engagement 
with Afghanistan, the following subsection will 
delineate China's involvement with Afghanistan in 
the political sphere and security sector. 
II. Political Engagement
Keeping in view its rising profile on the regional and 
global stage and the concerns that have arisen among 
Western countries and its neighbours, China has 
adopted the “good neighbourhood” policy over the 
11last ten years . There are three main reasons for this. 
Firstly, China doesn't want to be encircled by a 
combination of  regional and global powers and has 
been developing a favourable climate for regional 
cooperation and partnership to avoid such 
encirclement. Secondly, it wants to maintain dialogue 
and cooperation with its neighbours so as to 
“cushion any backlash that the spread of  its political 
12and economic power might provoke .” And thirdly, 
China needs to maintain domestic stability as well as 
enable development in its poorer northern and 
western regions. For this to happen it is imperative to 
have friendly relations with its neighbours. 
This “good-neighbourhood” policy more or less 
defines China's political engagement in Afghanistan 
and its proclamation of  non-interference in the 
internal political matters of  the latter. However, apart 
from the outward policy imperatives there are 
various layers to China-Afghanistan relations that are 
defined by geopolitical conditions of  the region, 
China's domestic conditions, and its ambitions as a 
rising power.
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Figure 2: China: Investments in Central and South Asia 
10(in million US$)
Country 2007  2008
Afghanistan 0.10 113.91
India 22.02 101.88
Iran 11.42 -34.53
Pakistan 91.063 265.37
Tajikistan 67.93 26.58
Uzbekistan 13.15 29.37
To start with, China's relations with Pakistan have 
had a major impact on Sino-Afghanistan relations. 
Well-known as “all-weather” friends, relations 
between China and Pakistan have bolstered due to 
their common strategic rivalry with India, 
intelligence cooperation to prevent Uighur 
separatists from establishing links with militant non-
state actors in Pakistan and Afghanistan, China's 
concern for its energy security, and to ensure safe 
supply routes. China will never want to rock the boat 
with Pakistan by taking direct action against Afghan 
insurgents that enjoy relations with Islamabad or by 
compelling Islamabad to take actions against 
terrorist groups within Pakistan. This is coupled with 
the fact that China would like to see Pakistan playing a 
more important role in Afghanistan and countering 
the growing Indian presence, regardless of  Pakistan's 
own ambition to develop “strategic depth” against 
India in Afghanistan. This is primarily because given 
Pakistan's tense relations with Afghanistan the idea 
of  the former honing “strategic depth” against India 
remains highly contested. On the other hand, China's 
constant support to Pakistan bilaterally as well as in 
Afghanistan will allow Pakistan to develop as a 
regional player with tremendous “strategic depth” 
for China vis-à-vis India. 
Secondly, moving beyond Pakistan, China's relations 
with Afghanistan are also defined by its geostrategic 
requirement to hone ties with the resource-rich but 
politically turbulent Central Asian republics. This is 
not only because of  the potential investment 
opportunities that these countries provide, but also 
to balance the presence of  the US and Russia in this 
region. China wants to maintain a steady flow of  
trade, contain the influx of  Tibetan and Uighur 
separatists, and control drug smuggling from 
Afghanistan. This has been done both by developing 
bilateral relationships and economic agreements with 
the Central Asian republics and in some cases 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO). 
The SCO has started playing a crucial role in 
Afghanistan over the past few years by extending 
logistical cooperation to the US-led NATO forces in 
Afghanistan. Comprising of  regional heavyweights 
such as China and Russia (apart from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), the SCO 
called for “joint operations in combating terrorism, 
drug-trafficking, and organised crime emanating 
from Afghanistan” at the Moscow Conference in 
132009 . It has also become proactive in involving 
Afghan government bodies, in a phased manner, to 
get involved in joint law-enforcement exercises, and 
has stepped up training of  personnel of  anti-
narcotics, anti-laundering and anti-terrorism 
organisations, as well as those involved in 
strengthening border controls. 
This is primarily because flow of  drugs with origins 
in Afghanistan is a major problem for the Central 
Asian republics and Russia, where more than 30,000 
people die of  drug abuse every year. Moreover, 
opium production has increased by about 44 times 
over the last decade, despite the presence of  1,50,000 
NATO troops and 2,00,000 Afghan soldiers on the 
14ground . According to some analysts, the SCO has 
been trying hard to get Afghanistan in its fold. Given 
these factors, China's engagement in Afghanistan 
through the SCO is an important factor that shapes 
its bilateral relations with the latter. 
The importance of  SCO in Afghanistan and for 
NATO has also increased with the continuously 
deteriorating US-Pakistan relations. NATO has 
reduced its dependence on Pakistan as a supplies 
transit point into Afghanistan by about 30 per cent 
over the last two years. As a result, currently, the 
coalition forces have secured transit routes to 
Afghanistan through Russia and other Central Asian 
countries for military and non-military supplies. 
Given the increasing clout of  the SCO in 
Afghanistan and increasing dependency among its 
member states in the security realm makes this 
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platform a very highly valued strategic asset for 
China. Thus, China will not want its policies with 
Afghanistan to complicate or jeopardize these 
relationships, and has thus kept a politically low 
profile in Afghanistan.
Thirdly, and importantly, China wants a stable 
Afghanistan in order to prevent radical Islamist 
terrorists, domestic insurgents, and transnational 
criminals to spillover into its politically volatile 
Xinjiang region. China has been witnessing a violent 
Uighur separatism movement in Xinjiang that got 
extensive support from the Taliban during its rule in 
Afghanistan. This was one of  the reasons why China 
out-rightly supported the Northern Alliance by 
providing it arms and ammunition against the 
Taliban. 
In fact, China has been blamed for “free-riding” on 
US' security apparatus in Afghanistan to make 
economic gains while not providing any security 
assistance. If  the Taliban regains power in 
Afghanistan or carves out safe-zones to train regional 
terrorist groups, these groups can very well attack 
Chinese targets. For instance, the Taliban held a 
couple of  Chinese engineers captive in 2009, but had 
15to leave them due to pressure from Pakistan . 
Moreover, China has blamed terrorist organisations 
functioning from Pakistan for fomenting violence in 
Kashgar, a city in the Xinjiang province and killing 
nineteen people in two separate terrorist attacks on 
1630-31 July 2011 . 
In addition to curbing the separatist backlash in 
Xinjiang, China is also concerned about smuggling 
of  drugs from Afghanistan which is the largest 
opium producer in the Golden Crescent–heroine-
producing countries that comprises certain regions 
of  Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. In 2007, more 
than 92 per cent of  world opium had origins in 
17Afghanistan . According to the “Afghanistan Opium 
Survey: 2011” by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the primary driver of  
opium production in Afghanistan is high sales prices. 
The southern province of  Helmand is the main 
opium cultivating province that provides 65,045 ha 
of  land for cultivating the crop. Following Helmand 
are the provinces of  Kandahar and Farah that have 
25,835 ha and 14,552 ha of  land under poppy 
18cultivation . 
Though the area under opium cultivation is expected 
to decrease in 2011 due to the ban on opium 
cultivation imposed by the Afghan government, 
Afghanistan is expected to remain the largest 
producer of  opium for many years to come. Coupled 
with this is the huge nexus of  drug trafficking and 
hawala in Afghanistan that leads to excessive 
smuggling of  opium into neighbouring countries as 
19well as the developed Western nations . These 
networks have played a very crucial role in 
maintaining the drug economy of  Afghanistan.  
The volume of  narcotics entering China from the 
Golden Crescent has increased over the last decade 
regardless of  tight security measures implemented 
by the Afghan government as well as the NATO 
forces. More than 20 per cent of  opium in China 
comes from Afghanistan today. The growing volume 
of  opium entering China is complemented by the 
increasing demand for illicit drugs. In 2008, use of  
20drugs increased by 9.2 per cent . Moreover, use of  
drugs in the Xinjiang region is the highest in the 
country and it has often been reported that drug 
trafficking is financed by various terrorist 
organisations active in that region. An increase in 
strength of  these terrorist organisations will 
empower the Uighur militants and threaten China's 
economic interests in Afghanistan.
Fourthly, Beijing's engagement with Kabul is also 
affected by its larger global ambitions as a rising 
power and its relationship with the US. On one hand 
the Chinese leadership does not want the security 
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situation in Afghanistan to be a rationale for long-
term presence of  US in the region, and on the other it 
doesn't want to completely align itself  with the US by 
supporting its short-term presence too much. This is 
because a long-term presence of  the US in 
Afghanistan will lead to “strategic encirclement” of  
China and weaken its influence in South Asia as well 
as Central Asia–two critical regions in its strategic 
framework. Moreover, siding with the US policies–as 
even China believes that US' presence in Afghanistan 
is important for security reasons in the short 
run–could incite greater terrorist activity against 
China by portraying it as being anti-Muslim. 
It has already become a target of  groups other than 
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and 
Baluchi nationalists after its support to the Red 
Mosque siege in Pakistan in 2007. China had strongly 
supported former President General Pervez 
Musharraf  in the siege of  the Red Mosque because 
the terrorist outfits functioning from the mosque had 
21kidnapped ten Chinese nationals . China's greatest 
concern in the event of  US failure in Afghanistan is 
the radicalisation of  the region to a level that 
extremism becomes contagious in the ethnic 
minorities in China. 
Finally, in the security sphere, though China offers 
training and material support, it has categorically 
refused to send in its troops regardless of  mounting 
pressure from the West. It has trained more than 200 
Afghan police and military officers since 2006, and 
provided about US$4 million worth material and 
22logistical support to the Afghan National Army . 
In the fall of  2009 China launched a mine-clearing 
training course for officers from the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) at the People's Liberation 
Army's (PLA) University of  Science and Technology 
in Nanjing. There have been high-level talks between 
the Karzai government and China on the possibility 
of  China providing training and equipping the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after the 
coalition forces pull out. 
III. Conclusion
China's cautious involvement in the political and 
security sphere of  Afghanistan coupled with highly 
aggressive economic engagement will help it to build 
very strong ties with the latter in the long term. The 
nature of  the China-Afghanistan relationship is very 
different from US-Afghanistan relationship. While 
the US is widely viewed as an antagonistic force in the 
region, China enjoys functional legitimacy even in 
politically sensitive areas of  the region. Its 
geographical proximity makes it ever more easy for 
China to consolidate its presence in the region as 
compared to the US. Although the US has invested 
more than China in Afghanistan and is planning to 
make full use of  its control over the country to make 
economic gains in whichever possible way it can, 
China's presence in Afghanistan is seen more 
benignly than that of  the US. 
As the above sections show, China is investing heavily 
in Afghanistan in order to secure its position in the 
future. Alongside this, it is being politically 
ambivalent and has made gestures suggesting that 
while military action in Afghanistan is futile and 
harms people, the US should transfer power to 
Afghan forces only when the country enjoys firm 
security and stability.
There have also been statements on increased 
involvement of  the SCO in the reconciliation and 
reintegration process in future along with other 
regional actors. China has come out categorically on 
pushing the US to broker peace between India and 
Pakistan in order to have a meaningful solution for 
Afghanistan–and has simultaneously thrown all its 
weight behind Pakistan. Furthermore, it has also 
been pushing for speedy rapprochement between 
Moscow and Washington given the fact that Russia 
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will play an important role in Afghanistan and is a 
regional power that needs to be accounted for. 
Though there are positive signs of  a big country 
playing an important and responsible role in its war 
ravaged neighbourhood, these statements also reflect 
that China is walking a diplomatic tightrope in 
Afghanistan. It is trying hard to maintain a silent but 
highly strategic presence in the country while at the 
same time managing its relations with other actors 
present in Afghanistan. Without doubt, its silent 
game has been highly successful in helping China 
achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. However, as the 
date of  complete security transition approaches in 
2014, and the politics between various domestic, 
regional, and international actors gets surcharged, 
China's intentions in Afghanistan and capabilities as a 
global power will come out in the open. One thing 
however is certain: China is poised to emerge as an 
important player in the Afghan endgame. 
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